Two-model consensus finds the bug. The receipt is the patch that landed.

Watcher always uses testnet chain config regardless of CONFIG.chainId

ALLOWED_ORIGIN defaults to '*' but Access-Control-Allow-Credentials is always 'true'

README claims testsPassed=13/13 but API hardcodes testsPassed=8/8

FloatVault.withdraw ignores strategy’s actualOut and attempts to transfer requested amount regardless of received funds

AgentFloatHook._beforeSwap uses regular approve (not forceApprove) on USDT-style tokens

Hardcoded AGBETS→V2 routing contradicts skill's own guidance and risks future breakage

cmd_claimable is documented as performing an on-chain read but actually does nothing

Insecure install method using curl | sh without integrity verification

isTransientError always returns true — non-transient errors are retried, burning attempts and LLM budget

Unhandled missing OPTIN_HMAC_SECRET causes 500 instead of a friendly error

Benchmark backfill logs can misreport flipped row count

`backfill-benchmark-flag.ts` script detection of direct execution is fragile under compiled / symlinked runs

Cron Authorization compare on truncated/unicode headers can throw on non-Latin Buffer length mismatch

Use of Array.prototype.toSorted may break on Node 18 environments (SSR route + script)

Inefficient Octokit instantiation per PR poll

Authorization timing check leaks length oracle; comment claims otherwise

Missing authentication/authorization on secret-management endpoints

Token reassembly from `claude setup-token` can splice in non-token text and write garbage to CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN

Synchronous child_process calls block the Node event loop on every request

Sharp-move dedup window violates idempotency under same-minute reruns

Undefined FORK_DEFAULT_BRANCH used to fetch aeon.yml from the fork

Exit taxonomy is missing V4_READINESS_REMOTE_API_ERROR status code listed in edge cases

v4-readiness manifest references files not included in the skill’s read set, causing missed Review detections

action query param does not distinguish enable vs missing — disable-link replay flips on

Trusted-sources logic documented in SKILL.md is not implemented in scan.sh

Security scanner uses PCRE tokens (\s, \b) with grep -E, causing widespread false negatives

Branch field in skills.lock is ignored when fetching latest commits, causing false results on non-default branches

last_checked is updated for UNREACHABLE entries, contradicting “last verified” intent and masking stale checks

State file rollback uses non-existent .bak and can cause data loss on write failure

deploy-watcher Vercel API call uses projectId but interpolates project slug

Daily spend circuit breaker compares strings as numbers; awk treats missing/non-numeric values as 0 → cap bypass

postprocess-admanage-create: ad sets with only campaignId (no parentCampaignConfigName) are not written to state

jq --argjson resp $resp will crash the result-writer if curl/server returns non-JSON, dropping the error record

ADMANAGE_API_KEY missing is documented as 'Hard-fails' but script actually exits 0

Slack bot-message filter is inverted: BOT_ID = "null" string check rejects real users

Telegram getUpdates acknowledges all updates (including other chats), risking message loss outside target chat

Jekyll site url points to a different repo than the project

Status page intro contradicts heartbeat's documented behavior on forks

Install one-liner `./aeon` is not a documented entry point for aeon-bench

Unauthenticated endpoint can trigger GitHub Actions via gh CLI

Detailed server error messages leaked to clients

Missing authentication/authorization on secrets API exposes GitHub secret management to any caller

Synchronous child_process calls block the Node event loop on every request

Duplicated section number '4' in heartbeat skill

Mode-switch trigger described inconsistently between docs and goals

Duplicated per-skill `model` overrides drift from the default and from each other

Middleware test shares a single response across all `it` blocks, defeating per-test isolation

Comment in middleware.ts misstates CSP policy ('No unsafe-inline') while code includes it

Health endpoint exposes operational details (env var presence, raw DB error messages) to unauthenticated callers